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ABSTRACT
Objectives: This study estimates the value that clients place on drug rehabilitation services at the
time of intake and how this value varies with the probability of success and availability of social
services.
Methods: We interviewed 241 heroin users who had been referred to, but had not yet entered,
methadone maintenance treatment in Baltimore,  Maryland. We asked each subject to state a
preference among three hypothetical treatment programs that varied across 3 domains: weekly fee
paid by the client out of pocket ($5 to $100), presence/absence of case management, and time spent
heroin-free (3 to 24 months).  Each subject was asked to complete 18 orthogonal comparisons.
Subsequently each subject was asked if they likely would enroll in their preferred choice among the
set of three.  We computed the expected willingness to pay (WTP) as the probability of enrollment
times the fee considered in each choice considered from a multivariate logistic model that controlled
for product attributes. We also estimated the price elasticity of demand.
Results: We found that 21% of clients preferred programs that were logically dominated by other
options.  The median expected fee subjects were willing to pay for a program that offered 3 months
of heroin-free time was $7.30 per week, rising to $17.11 per week for programs that offered 24
months of heroin-free time.  The availability of case management increased median WTP by $5.64
per week.  The fee was the most important predictor of the self-reported probability of enrollment
with a price elasticity of -0.39 (SE 0.042).
Conclusions: Clients' median willingness to pay for drug rehabilitation fell short of the average
program costs of $82 per week, which reinforces the need for continued subsidization as drug
treatment has high positive externalities.  Clients will pay more for higher rates of treatment success
and for the presence of case management.
Jody Sindelar
Yale School of Public Health
Yale University School of Medicine
60 College Street, P.O. Box 208034




The economic burden of illicit drug use was estimated at $143 billion in 1998 ($160 
billion in 2003) (Cartwright, W. S. and P. L. Solano 2003;Harwood, H. J., J. Fountain, and G 
Livermore 1998).   Contributing to this problem are an estimated 119,000 heroin users, 2.3 
million cocaine users, and 4.7 million Americans who used pain killers illicitly in 2003 
(Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2004).    Social costs are 
estimated to average $22,000 annually per illicit drug user ($160 billion/7.3 million users) 
(Cartwright, W. S. and P. L. Solano 2003). An estimated 7.3 million illicit drug users could 
be classified as needing specialty treatment for their drug problem (Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration 2004).  Of these, 1.5 million (20.8%) were estimated 
to perceive a need for drug abuse treatment. However, only 1.1  million (15%) illicit drug 
users actually received treatment for illicit drugs (Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration 2004).   Revenue from treatment came from a variety of sources, out 
of pocket (40.3%),  private health insurance (32.1%), Medicaid (24.0%), public assistance 
(21.1%), Medicare (16.4%), or with the help of family members (19%) (Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration 2004).   
 That only 21% of those with illicit drug problems recognized a need for treatment and only 
15% actually obtained treatment is the basis of a policy dilemma.   Treatment could help to 
reduce the external costs that illicit drug users impose on society via crime, interpersonal 
violence, spread of disease (e.g. HIV/AIDS and TB), and the socially insured health harms 
which drug users suffer.   Many drug users now enter treatment through coercion from the 
criminal justice system.  For example, In California, Proposition 36 was passed in 2000 to allow of those convicted of 1st and 2nd time nonviolent, simple drug possession to receive 
drug treatment instead of incarceration (www.prop36.org).   
For illicit drug users who recognize a need for treatment, subsidies for treatment can 
be justified on the basis of the large social externalities caused by drug illicit drug use.    
Methadone maintenance treatment is estimated to cost $82 per week and many in methadone 
stay in treatment for months (Roebuck, M. C., M. T. French, and A. T. McLellan 2003).  
However, studies have shown that treatment is cost effective (Cartwright, W.S. 2000;Jofre-
Bonet, M and JL Sindelar 2001;McCollister, K.E. and M.T. French 2003). Thus, it is in 
society’s interest to ensure that those who desire treatment can obtain it and can receive 
effective, high quality care. Further, longer lengths of stay have been shown to produce 
greater benefits (Zarkin, G.A. , L.J.  Dunlap, J.W.  Bray, and W.M. Wechsberg 2002).  
Despite the compelling public interest, it is thought that there is inadequacy of public funding 
to provide the good-quality, accessible care that would benefit not only the drug users but 
society at large. One way to expand the system would be to use price discrimination to 
provide revenue to clinics by encouraging individuals who are willing to pay to do so more 
often than currently occurs.   
    A rational approach to budgeting treatment subsidies would not require underwriting 
100% of treatment for every client. One could use a method of Ramsey pricing to base the 
subsidy for various drug users on their elasticity of demand (Baumol, William J. and David 
F. Bradford 1970).  Ramsey pricing would set up a regime of price discrimination that 
maximizes revenue to the drug rehabilitation system by charging more for those with higher 
demand and less for those with lower demand.   To optimize a Ramsey pricing system in 
drug treatment services, information on the price elasticity and how it varies by program and user characteristics would be needed.   However, information on price elasticity for the 
demand for treatment for illicit drug use is not currently available (Cartwright, W. S. and P. 
L. Solano 2003), but see (Borisova, N. N. and A. C. Goodman 2003) on travel time elasticity.  
The willingness of ordinary citizens to provide public support has been studied using 
contingent valuation survey methods in mall-intercept samples from Brooklyn, NY and the 
Triad area of North Carolina where investigators derived a mean willingness to pay of $37 
per payer towards expansion of drug treatment programs (counseling based, not methadone) 
to treat an additional 100-500 patients per year (Zarkin, G. A., S. C. Cates, and M. V. Bala 
2000).   
The objective of this paper is to inform cost-sharing strategies among users, providers 
and payers of drug rehabilitation.  In section 1, we develop a welfare economics model of the 
optimal subsidy that a social planner would pay to underwrite the drug rehabilitation of an 
illicit drug user.  Section 2 describes the primary data collected in Baltimore during 2002-
2003 as part of a conjoint analysis to estimate the demand for drug rehabilitation and leads to 
section 3 where we describe the methods used to analyze the data.  In section 4 we present 
our results.  Finally in section 5 we describe limitations of the analysis and discuss 
implications for policy.  
1.  A Model of the Optimal Subsidy 
Suppose there is a population of addicts and taxpayers. There are N
A addicts who pay 
no taxes and N
T taxpayers who pay a flat tax, t. We assume N
T>N
A and define the ratio of 
addicts to taxpayers as: q=( N
A/N
T). Each addict derives an identical income, y
A by inflicting 
property losses on the taxpayers.  Each taxpayer has income y
T and y
T>y
A. The average 
property loss per taxpayer is  (y
A N
A/N
T ) or qy
A .   The addicts have a demand for a medical treatment, m, that is 100% successful in curing their addiction thereby converting them into 
taxpayers.  The treatment is available at price, p per episode of treatment.  There is no other 
way to cure addiction besides purchasing the treatment.  We now consider a social planner 
who wants to maximize social welfare by devoting all of the tax towards a Pigouvian 
subsidy, s, applied to the price of the treatment.  The social planner’s budget constraint is 
N
Tt=mN
As, which implies that t=qms.  With the simplification that each member within the 
two subpopulations is identical, an egalitarian social planner weighs the utility of each 
member of the population equally, the social planner’s problem is to choose “s” in order to 
maximize W as follows: 
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Inserting the budget constraints and the tax identity t=qms into [1] we can recast the 
social welfare function as: 
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and  thus that j<1 because of the higher income and lower marginal utility of taxpayers’ 
consumption. This would mean that redistribution of 1 unit of consumption from a taxpayer 
to an addict creates a utility gain for the addict that outweighs the utility loss for the taxpayer.  
It also is possible that addiction could also lower the marginal utility of consumption because 










¹ and consider the two possibilities of j<1 and j>1. 
The first order condition that defines the optimal subsidy s*
 can be written as 
















(See Appendix A  for derivation.) 









So that the subsidy declines as the addict’s demand for treatment becomes more 
elastic. 
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=  For the typical case where j<1 and ep<1 , the point at which the optimal subsidy is 
zero occurs at non-negative values of y when addicts have a high willingness to pay for their 
own treatment.  The optimal subsidy can become negative (e.g. a surtax on treatment) if 
addicts have very high willingness to pay for treatment y>>0 or if it is socially optimal to 
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The foregoing considerations apply to the optimal subsidy assuming that all addicts 
are equal and have stable preferences.  As is well-known both from field experience with 
addicts and from economic theory (Dockner, Engelbert and Gustav Feichtinger 1993), an 
individual addict’s demand for treatment waxes and wanes over time.  If each addict had 
cyclic preferences so that their demand for treatment exhibited regular peaks and troughs, the 
optimal subsidy would need to be tailored to each addict as their willingness to comply with 
treatment waxed and waned.  One could, in principle, assess demand for treatment by 
repeatedly measuring an individual addict’s demand elasticity and then calibrate incentives 
and subsidies to keep pace with dynamic shifts in demand. As equation [6] indicates the 
optimal subsidy would have to keep pace with 1/e
2.  A more feasible approach would be to 
find easily measured predictors of demand for drug rehabilitation services in order to follow 
the dynamic evolution of these markers.  
 
2. Study population 
Between January, 2002 and January, 2003, 247 heroin injection drug users (IDUs) 
who requested and were granted an available methadone maintenance treatment slot by the Needle Exchange Program (NEP) program staff were invited to participate in a randomized, 
controlled trial of strengths-based case management vs. usual methadone maintenance.  The 
participation rate among those invited to participate was approximately 99.2% (245 of 247).  
Within 7 days of the initial interview, only 34% of the participants followed through and 
actually enrolled into the treatment slot to which they were assigned.  
  Details of this randomized trial are available elsewhere (Strathdee, S. A., Erin 
Ricketts, S Huettner, Llewellyn J. Cornelius, D Bishai, Jennifer R. Havens, P. Beilenson, C 
Rapp, J.J. Lloyd, and Carl A. Latkin 2006).  For IDUs who agreed to enter the trial, a signed 
consent was obtained and a baseline interview was conducted prior to the treatment intake 
appointment.  This study was approved by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health Committee on Human Research.  
To develop the survey instrument, we held key informant interviews with drug 
rehabilitation case managers and their administrator.  These revealed that price, duration of 
effect and the availability of case management would be the most salient program features to 
inquire about.  We studied five different prices ($5, $25, $40, $60, and $100 per week); two 
different availabilities of case management (available or not); and three different durations of 
treatment effect  (3, 6, or 24 months of freedom from heroin).  In order to cover a complete 
and orthogonal set of these product features with minimal respondent burden we consulted 
Sawtooth software (Louviere, Jordan J. 1988;Sawtooth Software Inc. 1999), and concluded 
that two parallel sets of 18 sequential choices among were necessary.  Subjects were 
randomized so that half of them saw each set. Each of the 18 choices imposed a new array of 
three hypothetical methadone maintenance program descriptions listing the price, duration of 
effect, and presence of case management  (See Figure 1).  All subjects were told to expect that they would have to pay for the hypothetical program themselves because insurance 
would not reimburse for the treatment.  Cards were-randomized so that each of the 5 prices 
was faced in about 20% of encounters, each case-management choice in roughly 50% and 
each effect duration in roughly 33% of product encounters.  After viewing the three options, 
subjects were asked, “From these three cards, which program would you PREFER?  The 
subsequent question was “Would you actually enroll in this program?”. 
Each version included one choice set in which one program clearly dominated the 
other two— a choice having case management, longer treatment effects, and lowest price.  
Subjects who preferred dominated programs were flagged.  
3. Statistical Analysis 
             The evaluation of each of these 54 drug treatment programs (18 sets × 3 programs 
per set) always occurred in the context of exactly 2 competitor programs.  The respondents 
indicated both which program they preferred and, in a separate question, whether or not they 
would pay for the preferred program.  This analysis studies the responses to the second 
question—“whether they would pay”.   
             The dependent variable in our model is a binary variable indicating whether the 
respondent would pay out of pocket to enter treatment with the preferred set of characteristics 
out of each set of the three alternatives.  The independent variables are the attributes (price, 
duration, and heroin-free time) of the programs considered and the baseline personal 
characteristics (e.g. socio-economic-demographic as well as addiction severity indices).   The 
generalized linear model which we studied takes the form  
[7] 
    E(Y)=g
-1[(b’P Pk +b’D Durk +b’SSk +b’AX)+(mQuestion+mSubject+e)] where g
-1() is an inverse logistic link function and (mQuestion+mSubject) are separate random 
effects associated with each of the 18 questions and each of the 245 subjects.   Y is an 
indicator of whether the subject would pay for the program and Pk is a vector of the 
program’s own price and the prices of the 2 competing programs appearing within each set of 
the 18 card sets.  Durk and SK are respectively, vectors of “own” and two competing 
durations of freedom from heroin and “own” and two competing indicators of availability of 
case management. The vector X represents individual respondent characteristics that might 
influence choice.    
             We first estimated this model using maximum likelihood methods based on the 
“gllam” program in Stata ™ (Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia and Anders Skrondal 2002).  We 
subsequently ran simple logit models without any random effects specification.  The 
increased efficiency of the computationally intensive maximum likelihood approach led to 
smaller standard errors but coefficient estimates that were very close to the simple logit 
estimates.  The significance of the coefficients was the same for the random effects and 
simple logit models. To ease interpretation we exponentiated the logit coefficients to obtain 
estimates of odds ratios.  We also used the “mfx” command in Stata 8.0 to convert the 
coefficients into marginal effects that could be interpreted as own price and cross price 
elasticities.  These arc elasticities have the conventional interpretation: the percentage 
increase in quantity demanded from a percentage decrease in price.  The elasticity will only 
be valid around the means of all of the covariates in the sample.  It will reflect the response to 
one program in an environment where there are 2 alternatives each with the mean price, duration, and case management availability of the products on the 18 sets of programs.  It 
will also reflect the mean income and perceived risk characteristics of the sample. 
4. Results 
For this sample of heroin users, the mean daily expenditure on heroin was $64.63 (SD 
$47.31), excluding two outliers who reported spending over $1000 per day on heroin.   Table 
1 shows the basic descriptive data from the sample. The sample had a majority of non-
Hispanic African Americans and males.  Self-reported income had a mean of $1207, a 
median $855, and a maximum of $8000 per month.  Only 8.5% of respondents were 
employed.  Over 38% of respondents reported deriving income from illegal sources; there 
may be underreporting. 
Respondents were asked to express a preference for one of the three hypothetical 
treatment programs in each of the 18 card sets.   Out of the 245 subjects, there were 5 
refusals to answer preference questions leading to the collection of preference statements for 
18 ´ 240 sets of three goods.  After indicating which of the three was preferred, respondents 
were asked if they would pay the stipulated fee to enroll.   The data describe the outcomes for 
18 card sets ´ 3 programs per card set ´ 240 subjects= 12,960 non-independent opportunities 
to express a willingness to purchase and or a preference.    
Figures 2 and 3 visually summarize the preference data. Figure 2 shows that the 
subjects intended to purchase the lowest priced ($5.00 per week) program 63% of the time 
when it was coupled with the promise of 24 months free of heroin.  This willingness to 
purchase at $5.00 fell to 40% with only 6 months free of heroin and to 36% if only 3 months.   
Figure 2 provides some face validity; the proportion intending to enroll decreases 
systematically with: 1) price for a given time free heroin, and 2) time free from heroin at each price. That is, the slopes are downward sloping and increase by time heroin-free.  Similarly, 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the presence of case management increases the probability of 
enrolling by about 10-20%, holding the fee constant. 
  Figures 2 and 3 can be used to calculate a summary measure of willingness to pay 
using “the area under each curve” and the data on the predicted probabilities of purchase. 
This can be done using a logit model of equation [7] (excluding the “X” variables) to impute 
the probability of purchase     ( pi ^
 for the “i-th” respondent) , for each of the 12,960 
respondent-product pairs and data on the prices and other product attributes.  The area under 
each of the curves in Figures 2 and 3 are Si  (pi ^
 ´ Pricei ) where Pricei is the price of the “i-
th” encountered product.  One could interpret (pi ^
 ´ Pricei ) as the statistically expected 
revenue from the “i-th” person-product encounter and offer summary measures of this 
distribution to convey willingness to pay of the sample.  The skewness of the distribution 
makes the median a better summary measure than the mean (Mitchell, R.  and R. Carson 
1989).    If a drug rehabilitation program practiced perfect price discrimination in a range 
between $5 and $100, the median expected revenue per client (corresponding to area under 
the curve in Figure 2) would be $17.11, $8.42, and $7.39 for programs that offered 24, 6, and 
3 months of heroin-free time.  For Figure 3, the corresponding summary measures are $13.05 
and $7.40 for programs that do and do not offer case management respectively.  However, 
these numbers could be underestimates of the true WTP as our 5 price points do not exhaust 
the full range of demand.  As can be seen in Figure 2, there remain as many as 40% of 
subjects who say they would purchase treatment at $100 per week.   If these percentages remain high at prices of $150, $200, or even $250, there could be substantial private 
willingness to pay that is unmeasured in our model. 
  Table 2 explores whether or not models of willingness to pay are robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of the 21% of subjects who were willing to purchase dominated 
products.   Table 3 shows that the effects of price and product attributes on WTP are nearly 
identical whether or not all subjects are included.  Case management increases willingness to 
pay, whether or not irrational responders are included, which confirms our assumption that 
case management is generally perceived as a normal good.   In separate analyses (not shown) 
a dummy variable indicating having preferred dominated choices had no effect on the 
probability of declaring a willingness to pay.  We ran additional analysis (not shown) to 
predict the probability of making a dominated choice.  The odds of preferring a dominated 
product were associated with several background variables, including seldom attending 
church (lower odds), homelessness (higher odds) and being married (lower odds) but not 
with schooling attainments.  To maximize the power of the sample, all of the subjects were 
retained for subsequent models and background variables were retained as covariates. 
  In Table 3 we display the results of 4 different multivariate models of the willingness 
to pay using logistic regression. Product attributes, especially price, are the most powerful 
determinants of the decision to purchase and personal attributes including the preference for 
dominated options have a very weak interaction with the effects of price. The principal 
sociodemographic background variables associated with WTP were co-residence with 
females or with parents, which increased WTP and frequent religious service attendance 
which decreased WTP. A separate study of the data from this trial confirmed that living with 
a sexual partner increased threefold the odds of actually entering treatment (Lloyd, J. J., E. P. Ricketts, S. A. Strathdee, L. J. Cornelius, D. Bishai, S. Huettner, J. R. Havens, and C. Latkin 
2005). It may be that the highly religious may see their religious participation as a substitute 
for opioid agonist therapy with methadone
1.  The components of the addiction severity index 
had opposing effects.  The psychiatric subscale was associated with increased willingness to 
pay while the medical and drug use subscales were associated with decreased willingness to 
pay.  
   Based on model 1 of Table 3, the price elasticity of demand for drug treatment was 
estimated at –0.39 based on a computation of marginal effects.  This elasticity was estimated 
at the sample mean of the product attributes implying a cash price of $48 per week of 
treatment, a mean stipulated treatment outcome of 10 months of freedom from heroin, and a 
49% probability that there would be case management services available.    
 
5.  Discussion 
  Our study revealed that drug addicts have a relatively inelastic demand for methadone 
maintenance treatment with an arc elasticity of –0.39.  This is the first estimate of price 
elasticity in the literature.  This estimate of elasticity is contingent on the setting of this study 
and the set of hypothetical program parameters, as well as the characteristics of the sample 
population. Thus, the estimate of the price elasticity is not as generalizable as we would like. 
However, as the first estimate, we hope that it paves the way for future research. Revealed 
preference data from price experiments in drug treatment clinics are difficult to obtain.   
Knowledge of the price elasticity is important as there are many applications to policy issues.  
                                                 
1 Marx may have had a different phenomenon in mind when he declared that “Religion is the opiate of the 
masses.” There is scant literature on the sensitivity of demand to program characteristics. An important 
prior study (Borisova, N. N. and A. C. Goodman 2003) showed that  addicts have a 
willingness to pay for reductions in travel time to methadone maintenance, but did not 
address the price elasticity of treatment.   
Our results have face validity in that increments in desirable program attributes such 
as availability of case management and the program’s stipulated time free from heroin 
dependence led to increments in demand. Also, we were able to provide stronger validation 
through revealed preference.  The 245 respondents in our trial were randomized after our 
survey to treatment with case management (Strengths Based Case Management (SBCM)) or 
without case management.  Assignment was revealed right after the WTP survey was 
conducted and subjects who were assigned to SBCM immediately received an initial session 
with a case manager. We subsequently observed whether the client actually followed through 
with the referral and later enrolled in the assigned treatment program by record linkage with 
the Baltimore Substance Abuse System. As reported in a separate paper 39.8% of clients 
assigned SBCM enrolled in treatment, compared to 26.5% of those in the control arm 
(Strathdee, S. A., Erin Ricketts, S Huettner, Llewellyn J. Cornelius, D Bishai, Jennifer R. 
Havens, P. Beilenson, J. J. Lloyd, C Rapp, and Carl A. Latkin 2004).  This 12.8 percentage 
point difference in enrollment rates is similar to the difference between the demand curves 
for case management in the two curves shown in Figure 3.  
  We found that product attributes, especially price, are the most powerful determinant 
of the decision to purchase. Thus, program characteristics may be the best vehicle on which 
to base price discrimination.      Policy Implications. The key policy issue is how to increase the number of heroin 
users who obtain treatment. Our findings suggest a perhaps greater role for private payments. 
With Ramsey pricing and price discrimination for private payers, the total revenue for 
treatment clinics could be expanded. Currently, there is ample price discrimination not only 
by individuals paying out of pocket, but also by public payers and private insurers. However, 
taking a Ramsey pricing approach might help to optimize the system and to provide greater 
benefits through treatment. The administrative challenges of actually imposing a system of 
Ramsey prices that charged each client in perfect proportion to their willingness to pay would 
be formidable. Instead of individual level price discrimination, market segmentation might be 
more likely.  The market could be segmented perhaps by clinic or by program within a clinic, 
with some clinics or programs offering higher service quality or specific services which 
would attract those more willing to pay.  Our study shows that case management or concierge 
type services increase willingness to pay. Issues of equity might surface with such price 
discrimination, but this concern would by partially offset by the potential to increase funds 
for treatment. The cyclical nature of demand would be difficult to address, however, as 
addicts drop in and out of treatment repeatedly during the course of their disease.  It would be 
far better to use a dynamic subsidy system to keep individuals in treatment, but it would be 
quite difficult to design an effective, dynamic subsidy system. 
  Although our estimates suggest a role for private payments, our estimates of expected 
revenue from heroin addicts fall significantly short of being able to finance the full cost of 
drug rehabilitation.   According to our estimates, a drug rehabilitation system that could 
maintain a discriminatory pricing regimen would obtain a median expected revenue per 
addict of $7.40 to $17.11 per week with a clientele similar to our sample. This would not cover the cost of outpatient methadone maintenance programs which average $82 per week, 
with the least cost program at $42 per week (Roebuck, M. C., M. T. French, and A. T. 
McLellan 2003).  This suggests that subsidies ranging from $65 to $75 per patient per week 
would be necessary in order to make up the difference. Note that counseling based drug 
treatment costs considerably less and the length of stay is much shorter, but there are no data 
on WTP. 
  One could argue for subsidies equal to the full cost of treatment because of the large 
negative externalities of drug use joint with the fact that drug users seems resistant to 
entering treatment on their own (many come to treatment under the duress of the criminal 
justice). Indeed, a prior study found that the availability of free drug treatment was the most 
important predictor of actual treatment entry (Booth, R. E., C. Kwiatkowski, M. Y. Iguchi, F. 
Pinto, and D. John 1998). However, co-payments generate income and the revenue could be 
used to increase the supply of treatment slots and conduct outreach.  Demand for treatment 
might be increased by using the revenue for social marketing (e.g. public service 
announcements) if some of the revenues accrued to government payers. To the extent that 
providers reap some of the revenue of higher co-payments, they could finance marketing 
campaigns for their clinics which might spillover benefits to increasing the overall demand as 
well as attract clients to their specific clinic.   
Another alternative to increasing demand would be to pay drug addicts to seek 
treatment.  The optimal co-payment for selected addicts could be negative in order to attract 
addicts who presently have no desire for treatment. “Contingency management” techniques 
are currently being designed to pay those in treatment to attend counseling sessions and to 
make payments contingent on verified abstinence from drugs.  Some of the systems are designed with escalating payments systems which increase the price of use of drugs over 
time and with ‘booster payments’. These systems have been found to be effective and could 
perhaps serve as the basis of a dynamic negative subsidy (Petry, N.M., J.  Pierce, M.L.  
Stitzer, J.  Blaine, J.M.  Roll, and A. Cohen 2005).  
    This study shows that drug addicts’ demand depends on price, service amenities and 
perceived treatment outcomes.  Estimates of addicts’ price elasticity for drug treatment have 
many policy applications, one of which is the development of an optimal subsidy system.  
Segmentation of the market for drug rehabilitation is currently practiced in many urban areas 
and enables programs to charge differential user fees based on accompanying amenities like 
service hours and locations.  The appropriate deployment of cost-sharing mechanisms can 
increase the revenue for programs and potentially free up public funds to further expand 
treatment availability and conduct outreach.  Informed and thoughtful development of cost-
sharing mechanisms for drug treatment can expand service capacity and reduce the negative 
externalities associated with drug use.    
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Age at interview in years 245 42.28 (8.09)
Male 245 69%
Married 244 8%
Non-hispanic black 244 77%
Non-hispanic white 244 20%
Hispanic 244 1%
Miles from their zip code to treatment referral site 233 5.02 (5.24)
% non-self  HH members female 197 57%
Lives in other's house/apt 243 65%
Any support from illegal 245 38%
Individual Income per month 244 1202.74 (1107.82)
Lives with parents 245 6%
Family Social Status ASI Subscale 239 0.21 (0.21)
Psychiatric Severity ASI Subscale 237 0.16 (0.22)
Legal Severity ASI Subscale 231 0.31 (0.26)
Alcohol Severity ASI Subscale 237 0.11 (0.2)
Drug Severity ASI Subscale 236 0.39 (0.09)
Employment Severity ASI Subscale 234 0.83 (0.2)




Price of the program under consideration -0.002 -0.003
(7.22)*** (8.22)**
Availability of case management in the program under consideration 0.119 0.166
(7.37)*** (8.34)**
Time free of heroin in the program under consideration 0.009 0.012
(8.70)*** (10.99)**
Price of the first alternative 0.001 0.001
(5.65)*** (4.85)**
Price of the second alternative 0 0
(2.21)** -1.62
Availability of case management in the the first alternative -0.043 -0.042
(2.64)*** (2.18)*
Availability of case management in the the second alternative -0.059 -0.017
(3.87)*** -0.9
Time free of heroin in the the first alternative -0.001 -0.007
-1.36 (5.32)**
Time free of heroin in the the second alternative -0.005 -0.007
(4.78)*** (5.53)**
Observations 7506 5454
Robust z-statistics in parentheses





Table 2.  Estimates of WTP: Comparing results including and excluding subjects 
who (irrationally) preferred dominated choicesTable 3  Logistic Models of WTP for Drug Rehabilitation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
-0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.014
(18.13) *** (8.43)*** (7.97)*** (8.50)*** (8.17)***
0.697 0.676 0.710 0.689 0.661
(13.04) *** (5.90)*** (7.41)*** (6.01)*** (5.69)***
0.048 0.045 0.048 0.045 0.044
(15.03) *** (11.27)*** (12.81)*** (11.23)*** (10.54)***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(8.27) *** (4.22)*** (5.08)*** (4.08)*** (4.00)***
Price of the second alternative 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(2.8) *** (2.52)** (1.49) (2.61)*** (2.56)**
-0.247 -0.228 -0.246 -0.232 -0.238
-(4.87) *** (3.05)*** (3.19)*** (3.08)*** (3.14)***
-0.232 -0.279 -0.232 -0.280 -0.275
-(4.48) *** (3.20)*** (2.95)*** (3.22)*** (3.13)***
-0.021 -0.026 -0.020 -0.026 -0.024
-(6.11) *** (5.19)*** (4.09)*** (5.20)*** (4.69)***
-0.033 -0.039 -0.032 -0.039 -0.037
(9.56) *** (7.43)*** (6.70)*** (7.64)*** (7.13)***
Age at interview in years -0.002 -0.001 0
-(0.58) -(0.48) -0.15
Male 0.059 -0.067 -0.058
-(1.34) -(1.22) -1.05
Married 0.068 0.096 0.066 0.123
-(0.96) -(1.17) -(0.82) -1.43
Non-hispanic black -0.156 0.065 0.03
-(0.98) -(0.3) -0.14
Non-hispanic white -0.213 0.012 -0.025
-(1.55) -(0.06) -0.14




% non-self  HH members female 0.152 0.174 0.177
(2.19)** (2.66)*** (2.43)**
Attends svc <1/month 0.111 0.097 0.117
-(1.32) -(1.1) -1.31
Attends svc 2-3/month 0.010 0.017 -0.006
-(0.17) -(0.32) -0.11
Attends svc weekly 0.014 0.007 0.022
-(0.18) -(0.08) -0.28
Attends svc >1/wk -0.646 -0.634 -0.578
(2.31)** (2.26)** (2.05)**
Lives in other's house/apt 0.043 0.041 0.027
-(0.59) -(0.56) -0.33
Any support from illegal 0 0 -0.094
-(1.55) -(1.29) -1.49
Individual Income per month 0 0 0
-(1.27) -(1.55) -1.57
Lives with parents 0.242 0.241 0.272
(1.78)* (1.76)* (2.02)**
Psychiatric Severity ASI Subscale 0.254
(1.99)**
Drug Severity ASI Subscale -0.201
(2.33)**
Medical Severity ASI Subscale -0.531
-(1.57)
Constant -0.984 -0.973 -0.809 -0.935 -0.722
-(44.98) *** (8.71)*** (4.75)*** (3.93)*** (2.67)***
Observations 12960 9936 12852 9882 9342
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Miles from their zip code to treatment 
referral site
Availability of case management in the 
the first alternative
Availability of case management in the 
the second alternative
Time free of heroin in the the first 
alternative
Time free of heroin in the the second 
alternative
Price of the program under 
consideration
Availability of case management in the 
program under consideration
Time free of heroin in the program 
under consideration






Price ($ per Week)                       $25
Availability of Social Services    No
Time Spent Heroin Free      3 months
Program A Program B Program C
Price ($ per Week)                      $40 Price ($ per Week)                        $60
Availability of Social Services      No Availability of Social Services     Yes
Time Spent Heroin Free       6 months Time Spent Heroin Free         6 months
One of the 18 Sets of Cards for Each SubjectFigure 2 





































Heroin Free for 3 Months
Heroin Free for 6 Months
Heroin Free for 24 MonthsFigure 3 
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